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PREFACE

Strategic planning, as we understand the term, concerns the methods and
mechanics of waging war. It is the business of the professional military men .
. . . The formulation of military policy, on the other hand, means to us the
determination of whether and when and under what circumstances and for
what purposes we should go to war. It concerns political decisions rather
than military methods and is the business of the Congress and ultimately of
the people in our democracy.
From an editorial "Policy and Strategy"
The Providence Journal
September 19, 1949
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When the 104th Congress convened in January 1995, a long simmering
debate came to a boil over a proposed display of the Enola Gay at the
Smithsonian's Air and Space Museum in Washington, D.C. The Enola Gay
was the B-29 that dropped the atom bomb on Hiroshima on 6 August 1945. 1
Peace activists and some historians, who considered the bombing an
American disgrace, favored graphic depictions and narratives describing the
bomb's devastation. Veterans' groups and others objected. They wanted text
material that explained what led to the bombing -the already high American
casualties in the Pacific War (150,000 killed or wounded on both sides in the
battle for Okinawa alone)-and note taken on the projected allied and
Japanese casualties when Japan's home islands were invaded. 2
Apologists for dropping the bomb base their case largely on the thousands
of civilian casualties at Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The inference was that not
only were these civilian casualties, but innocent civilian casualties.
This essay looks at the issue of civilian casualties in various types of
armed conflict some 50 years later and discusses a number of questions that
are but logical extensions of the Enola Gay debate.
In January of 1994, the U.S. Naval Institute published an article, "Getting
It Right From ... the Sea," by General Carl E. Mundy, Jr., Commandant of the
U.S. Marine Corps. While the article dealt with the effective and efficient use
of naval expeditionary (task) forces, primarily with respect to regional
conflicts, of equal interest was the way in which a commandant of the Marine
Corps, perhaps the most no-nonsense branch of our armed forces, viewed (1)
total and less than total wars, (2) collateral damage, (3) the use or non-use of
various weapons in our arsenal, and (4) the political costs incurred when
American armed forces are put in harms way. Not addressed, however, was
whether senior military officers should share responsibility with political
leaders, that is, become decision makers with regard to when and where to
commit forces, with what weapons, and under what constraints.

1Today's debate: Remembering World War II. Our View: "Politics has no place in Enola Gay Exhibit."
Opposing View: Don't rewrite history." USA Today Qanuary 30, 1995), p. 14A.
20perations "Olympic," and "Coronet" were approved by President Harry Truman on 24 July 1945.
"Olympic" was the mvasion of Kyushu on 1 November 1945. "Coronet" was the invasion of Honshu on 1
March 1946. Approximately four million U.S. servicemen, including 1.5 million combat forces, would take
part. American casualties were estimated in the hundreds of thousands. Japanese casualties, including the
pre-invasion fire bombings of Japanese cities, were estimated in the millions.

1

To quote General Mundy:
In addition, we cannot ignore the political ramifications of
collateral damage that even precision weapons can cause. In
wars that are less than total-potentially, most of our future
wars-we may not be able to use weapons, however effective, if
their political cost outweighs their tactical gain. There may be a
time and place when near perfect accuracy just will not be good
enough. That is not a pleasant thought, but it is a consideration
we cannot ignore when we look at new systems and the
application of existing technologies. 3

Questions:
What difference, if any, is there between total war and less than total war?
What are the implications for our armed forces, particularly our combat
forces, if a distinction is made?

Discussion:
The model for total war is World War II. The London blitz, the bombing
of Coventry, Cologne, and Dresden, the siege of Stalingrad, the fire bombings
of Japanese cities and the later use of atomic weapons, leave no doubt about
the totality of the conflict. On the other hand, Korea, Vietnam, and the 1991
Gulf War were characterized by the restrained use of weapons and military
options.
In total war, the goal of national leadership historically has been to bring
about the surrender or unconditional surrender of the enemy. 4 The objective
military function is to achieve this end at a minimum cost in lives and
national treasure.
Total war is also an unambiguous concept and generally understood by
those doing the fighting. Limited wars, on the other hand, imply limited
goals and as such are ambiguous and complex concepts. This ambiguity
requires that the nation's leaders, both civilian and military, constantly
explain and rationalize the reason for the conflict, a task which becomes
increasingly difficult as time passes and, casualties mount.

3carl E. Mundy, Jr. "Getting It Right ... From the Sea," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1994, p. 71.
4In general, the "surrender" of an enemy implies that surrender terms will be negotiated. Unconditional
surrender negates any negotiation of surrender terms by the enemy. Confederate forces surrendered
unconditiona11y in the American Civil War as did Germany in World War II.
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Again quoting General Mundy:
In the future, we will ... be operating in a political environment
in which there is an "economy of will." The American people
will not tolerate high casualties in military operations they do
not view as critical to our national security. Either under U.N.
auspices, or multilaterally-or even unilaterally-many of our
likely tasks will not affect the national security of the United
States directly. Many of our future operations are going to have
objectives that-while important in a regional sense-may not
be seen as vital in Peoria.s
While ambiguous and complex politics are fairly open to debate by the
electorate, from military tactics to broad issues of national policy, such debate
cannot be limited to the home front. In an age of instant communication, the
issues will also be argued at every level of the military establishment. After
all is said and done, is the soldier, sailor and airman doing the fighting more
willing to fight, and possibly die, for something he understands than for
something he does not?
The use of limited military force and by definition, limited political
objectives, has a poor track record in the West. Witness Korea, the Bay of
Pigs, Vietnam, Lebanon, Iran and Iraq. Our cold war adversaries, however,
used whatever force was necessary to achieve their objectives. Witness the
swift dispatch of the Czech and Hungary uprisings by the Soviet Union, the
crushing of Tibet dissidents by the Chinese People's Liberation Army, and the
more recent crushing of Chechnya's rebellion by Russian military forces.
Afghanistan was a Soviet failure but only because the United States decided to
contest the outcome.

Question:
Is weaponry for total war significantly different than weaponry for less
than total war? Under what circumstances, if any, is the use of atomic
weapons an option? If there is a difference between weapons dependent
upon what type of conflict is being waged, what is the implication for defense
spending?

Searl E. Mundy, p. 69.
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Discussion:
Improving weapon accuracy, that is, hitting what you aim at with a high
probability of success, is certainly an acceptable goal of military research and
development. The more accurate the weapon, the less chance it will have to
be used a second or third time. The savings is easily identifiable in terms of
lives and material. The problem, however, is not with developing so-called
smart weapons bu t rather the argument that unless a weapon is highly
accurate it should not be used at all, that is, cause collateral damage and kill
innocent civilians.
From this point the debate can be extended to what constitutes an
acceptable target. An ammunition factory, a bridge, a rail yard, an oil refinery,
a column of tanks, government complexes ... ? However, as the number of
targets grows, as it will in all conflicts, the number of targets that can be more
quickly destroyed by conventional but less accurate weapons will also grow.
In a total war, no problem arises with respect to the choice of weapons. We
use what accomplishes the task with the least cost in lives and material. In
less than total war, however, an increasingly popular position is to use only
accurate weapons aimed at strictly military targets. Carried to a logical end,
this raises the question of how much money should be allocated to
developing and producing sophisticated, "civilian friendly" weapons and
how much should be spent for conventional weapons that are less accurate
but more effective with respect to most enemy targets. Should a target be
destroyed by naval guns, cruise missiles, or long range artillery with a
minimum risk to military personnel or should a squadron of F-16s fitted with
laser guided bombs be used with a much greater risk to men and equipment ..
. very expensive equipment and very expensive men and women?
As to the willingness to use atomic weapons, peace as between NATO and
the Warsaw Pact for the past 50 years was maintained not because a balance of
conventional forces existed but rather the assured mutual destruction of both
alliances should atomic weapons be used. While mass destruction weapons,
biological and chemical as well as atomic, are hardly civilian friendly, they
nonetheless kept the peace in Europe under the most trying of circumstances.
One might also ask-Is a fourth war between India and Pakistan more or
less likely now that both are atomic powers? Or would conflict between
Taiwan and Communist China be more or less likely if Taiwan, as well as the
People's Republic of China, had nuclear weapons?
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Question:
What is the distinction between armed conflict at whatever level and using
our armed forces as peacekeepers in combat areas? What implication does
such a difference have with respect to training doctrine?

Discussion:
The distinction between total war, less than total war, and peacekeeping
as a military operation is simply one of degree. In total war, the use of
available weapons is seldom constrained. Civilian casualties, innocent and
otherwise, are accepted. In less than total war the use of available weapons is
constrained while political goals constrain military options. In the role of
peacekeepers, our armed forces must adapt to the role of a typical police force.
When deadly force may be used is tightly proscribed . . . generally not to fire
until fired upon. While we have not come to the point of "Mirandizing" a
potential enemy ... we are coming very close.
Developing a training doctrine for combat forces across a range of conflict
situations is no easy task, if it can be accomplished at all. Infantry basic
training which for the moment, still includes instruction in hand to hand
combat where the objective is to kill or be killed, is hardly an option when the
mission is to disarm an enemy but in no case do him bodily harm. Few
would point to Somalia and Bosnia as success stories wherein military forces
were used in a peacekeeper role.

Question:
What is the definition of collateral damage? Correspondingly. is there
such a thing as innocent civilians in war. no matter what the conflict may be
called?

Discussion:
Collateral damage is "spillover" damage inflicted on adjacent or nearby
structures and populations when the intended target is destroyed or damage
caused when the intended target is only partially destroyed or missed entirely.
Collateral damage becomes visible and controversial when it includes
civilian casualties. 6
6when NATO aircraft began sustained attacks on Bosnia Serb military targets in September of 1995, civilian
casualties were reported by the provisional Bosnian Serb government and not denied by NATO. The NATO
response was that civilian casua1ties, while not intended, could not be avoided.
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As to whether collateral damage in all of its aspects, including civilian
casualties, can be avoided is an impossible question. It comes down to
whether it is acceptable to kiUa civilian while he/she is at work in a
ammunitions factory, railway yard or utility plant, as opposed to killing him
in his home which was destroyed in an attack on an otherwise acceptable
military target.
The other side of the coin is whether or not there is such a thing as a
casualty-free conflict. One unintended result of the Gulf War is that the
public has come to expect minimum military casualties when our forces are
committed to combat. There is, however, a basic contradiction here. In many
instances, weapons that inflict collateral damage are the ones that minimize
the risk to our military personnel, while civilian friendly weapons are not
only more expensive but increase the risk to those charged with delivering
them.7

Question:
If a distinction is to be made as between a limited war and total war,
where does responsibility lie with respect to deciding which type of conflict it
will be?

Discussion:
As to which type of war our armed forces will be asked to fight and who is
to decide should never be in question. The responsibility is that of the
President of the United States.

Question:
If senior military officers become a part of the decision process, that is,
decision makers, with respect to which type of war will be waged. can they
then in good faith uphold and support the oldest of military traditions-an
officer's responsibility for the well being and safety of the men and women
under this command?

7In 1995, NATO forces employed both "smart bombs" delivered by FA-18 aircraft and cruise missiles
launched from ships against Bosnian Serb military targets. The air delivery system imposed a significantly
greater risk to personnel and equipment than the sea launched system but w as generally more accurate, that is,
civilian friendly.
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Discussion:
Few political leaders, whether presidents or other high level civilian
decision makers, are willing to unconditionally accept responsibility for
deciding under what circumstances to commit our armed forces and accept
responsibility for the casualties that follow. President Harry Truman's
decision to use atomic weapons against Japan and to accept full responsibility
for his decision, is an exception to the general rule. On the other hand, the
Vietnam War is a casebook study of where the line between traditional
military decisions and political decisions became indistinguishable. The
debate as to where blame lies for North Vietnam's conquest of the South is
ongoing and probably will never be agreed upon. 8
In deciding the level of conflict and, by definition, the constraints
imposed, the Commander in Chief does not lack for civilian advice and
expertise. Long recognized sources include the National Security Council, the
State Department, the Central Intelligence Agency, the President's cabinet, his
civilian appointees in the Department of Defense, and knowledgeable
members of Congress.
Laying out costs in terms of casualties and material and the likelihood of
success of various options put forth by civilian authorities is, however, a
military responsibility. But tasking our military leaders to be part of the
decision process with respect to deciding on the level of conflict and the
constraints to be imposed on military action puts them in an untenable
position with respect to their first duty-the well being of those under their
command.9 By definition, this includes doing all possible to minimize
casualties.

Conclusion

With the adoption of the American Constitution over 200 years ago, the
United States asserted in unambiguous language that the nation's military
would be subordinate to civilian authority. The power to declare war was
delegated to the Congress. 10 Also implied was that conduct of foreign policy
rest with the Executive Branch of government.

8A detailed account of the overlap between political and military decision making during the Vietnam War
can be found in William C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (Garden City, NY: Doubleday & Co., 1976).

9A President (and his deputies) can bring tremendous pressure on senior military leaders to make
recommendations as to the kind of war to fight and thus become a part of that decision.
10The United States has suffered over 125,000 casualties in post World War II conflicts, yet Congress has
never declared war.
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Throughout World War II, the different responsibilities of the military,
the executive, and Congress in time of conflict, as envisioned by the framers
of the Constitution, were generally adhered to with little debate. After World
War II, however, things changed. A Joint Chiefs of Staff, headed by a
chairman, was specifically tasked to give advice to the President on military
matters. The secretaries of War (Army), Navy and Air Force became
subordinate to the Secretary of Defense with only nominal authority over the
services they headed. The Office of the Joint Chiefs became in fact, if not
name, a fourth branch of service.
Armed conflicts became police actions, regional conflicts, people's
revolutions, insurrections, undeclared wars, covert operations, and United
Nations missions, but never total wars. When General Mundy stated that
most of our future wars will be less than total wars he should have also noted
that all conflicts involving American forces over the past 50 years have been
less than total wars.
Why conflicts in the last half of the 20th century were something less
than total wars is not hard to understand given that the world was essentially
divided into two powerful military alliances, each having the ability to
destroy the other many times over. A declared war could escalate into a total
war, a contingency which neither side wanted. Thus did armed conflicts
become less than total wars with limited goals and constraints on military
options while military options that might lead to total war were studiously
avoided. In such a cold war environment decisions with respect to when and
at what level conflicts should be fought became joint decisions between
military and civilian leaders. And as in the case of most joint committee
type decisions, accountability for a particular decision made was no longer
possible. The Vietnam War was a textbook case in this respect. Generals
became politicians, politicians became generals, while combat forces became
replaceable pawns in a seemingly never ending chess game.
A second result of keeping conflicts at a below total war threshold was a
growing public expectation that less than total wars, whatever they were
called, should be civilian casualty free.
Now, in the last decade of the 20th century, the world has changed again.
With the collapse of the Soviet Union the probability of a total war on the
scale of World War II has greatly diminished. In this new environment it is
time to reexamine the decision making process which leads to committing
American armed forces to combat. That a reexamination is called for can be
seen in the public's resistance to committing our armed forces to conflicts
where no overriding U.S. national interest is at stake as poll after poll has
shown.
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One way to address the public's concern is a return to accountability
where our civilian leaders, and them alone, make the decision of when to
commit forces, where to commit forces, and what constraints are to be placed
on military action. 11 Once these decisions have been made, our military
leaders become accountable for achieving civilian determined goals at the
least cost in lives and material. But more important, those who lead can once
again, in clear conscious, carry out their first duty-the well being of those
under their command. Field Marshall William Slim, commanding officer of
British forces in Burma in World War II, probably said it best and for all time:
I tell you, as officers, that you will not eat, sleep, smoke, sit
down, or lie down until your soldiers have had a chance to do
these things. If you will hold to this, they will follow you to the
ends of the earth. If you do not, I will break you in front of your
regiments. 12
Stated another way by a civilian:
When an officer accepts command of troops, he accepts not only
the responsibility of accomplishing a mission, but the
guardianship of those who serve under his command. The
military h ierarchy exists and can function because enlisted
personnel entrust their well-being and their lives to those with
command authority. When those in command authority either
abdicate that authority or neglect that guardianship, more is lost
than lives. Lost also is the trust that enables those who follow to
follow those who lead. 13
Representative Dan Daniel, In hearings on
the Beirut tragedy

To paraphrase Field Marshall Slim. "Give our forces a clearly stated
reason to fight for a clearly stated end. Do all in our power to minimize the
inevitable casualties they will suffer, including use, as appropriate, all
11 While there is little doubt that constraints will be placed on military action in future conflicts involving
American forces, the important thing is that the President and his civilian deputies, those who impose the
constraints, be clearly held accountable for results .. . . whether good or bad. The 1991 Gulf War, like the
Vietnam War, is one where the decision on constraints was jointly determined. In the aftermath of victory
there was little criticism of results. Only later when it was perceived that Iraq was still a threat to peace in
the region did questions surface about who was responsible for ending the conflict short of removing Sadaam
Hussem from power.
12 Quoted in: James Fallows, National Defense (New York: Random House, 1981), p. 110.
13 Quoted in: Richard A. Gabriel, Military Incompetence: Why the American Military Doesn 't Win (New
York: Hall and Wang, 1985), p. xv.
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weapons available. Do this and they will be little concerned with what the
conflict is called."14

14 Quoted in Clinton Whitehurst, "Limited War ls Played By Different Rules," Anderson Independent-Mai/,
(April 2, 1995, p. 3B.
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